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ABSTRACT 
This research has the purpose to examine the balance sheet existence as an earnings 
management constraint. This research use the secondary which it is taken from the 
quarterly financial statement of manufacture companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) during 2008-2009 periods. This research used 68 manufacture 
companies as its sample. Then, the obtained data has regression analyzed by 
Generalized Ordered Logit Model. The Output of regression indicates that there is 
significant relation between net assets with the earnings surprise. The reporting 
earnings surprise smaller negative or larger positive decrease when the value of net 
asset is overstated. So, it can be concluded that balance sheet is as an earnings 
management constraint. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Investor use balance sheet information 
to infer earnings management constraint and 
the extent to which they utilize that infor-
mation to assess the quality of subsequent 
earnings surprises. If investors use constraint 
information to infer the quality of reported 
earnings, a stronger reaction to subsequent 
earnings surprises should be observed for ex-
ante constrained firms than for ex-ante 
flexible firms. When a firm reports a small 
positive earnings surprise (defined as 0 to 2 
cents), the firm could have arrived at that 
result through real performance or through 
earnings management. Smith (2004) stated 
that investors use balance sheet information to 
determine a constraint level and use this 
constraint information to infer the quality of 
earnings reported in subsequent earnings 
announcements. Other end users of financial 
reports, such as mutual fund managers and 
individual investors, often rely on analysts’ 
reports and recommendations, given the 
constraints of their limited time and resources. 
Smith (2004) argued that the results 
provided by the balance sheet constraint 
literature give important insights into how the 
accounting reporting system in conjunction 
with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), can constrain earnings management. 
The balance sheet constraint concept is not 
only useful in determining the likelihood a 
firm will at least meet the consensus forecast, 
but it is also potentially useful in interpreting 
the quality of subsequent earnings surprises. 
In recent years, the existence and perva-
siveness of earnings management and the 
circumstances under which firms are most 
likely to engage in earnings management have 
been subjects of considerable discussion and 
debate among accounting researchers as well 
Dwi Sudaryati, The Balance Sheet As an Earnings….. 
 
 
2 
 
as among practitioners, government regula-
tors, and investors. While the methods used 
by various studies to detect earnings mana-
gement are controversial and results not 
always consistent, previous findings suggest 
that earnings management occurs and is quite 
prevalent (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
Earnings management can be classified 
into three categories: fraudulent accounting, 
accruals management and real earnings 
management. Fraudulent accounting involves 
accounting choices that violate GAAP. 
Accruals management involves within-GAAP 
choices that try to “obscure” or “mask” true 
economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000).  
The balance sheet as the element in 
financial reports can be used by manager as 
an information to manage earnings. The 
balance sheet information also can be used by 
investor to infer the quality of earnings 
reported in subsequent earnings announce-
ments. Barton and Simko (2002); Hansen 
(2004) conclude that overstated balance 
sheets become constraints on firms’ ability to 
manage earnings. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Objective of Financial Reporting 
The objective of financial reporting are 
to provide (1) information that is useful in 
investment and credit decisions, (2) informa-
tion that is useful in assessing cash flow pros-
pects, and (3) information about enterprise 
resources, claims to those resources, and 
changes in them (Kieso and Weygangt, 1998). 
Effective use of financial statements 
requires that the user understands the roles of 
those responsible for preparing and auditing 
financial statements. Financial statements are 
the representation of management (Cooper et 
al., 1997).  
The following three categories of user 
groups are identified as the primary users of 
general purpose financial reports, and those 
who’s common information needs should 
dictate the type of information to be disclosed 
by such reports (1) resource providers include 
those who may be compensated either directly 
or indirectly for the resources they provide, 
(2) recipients of goods and services are those 
who consume or otherwise benefit from the 
goods and services provided by the reporting 
entity, and (3) parties performing a review or 
oversight function including parliaments, 
governments, regulatory agencies, analysts, 
labour unions, employer groups, media and 
special interest community groups, perform 
oversight or review services on behalf of the 
community.1 
 
The Balance Sheet  
A balance sheet is a statement of the 
financial condition of a business at a specific 
time. It is one of the principal reports 
provided by a good accounting system. The 
balance sheet shows what is owned in a 
business, what is owed, and the owner’s share 
or net worth of the business. By comparing 
past balance sheets with the present balance 
sheet, the growth or decline of assets, loans, 
and net worth of a business can be 
determined. 
The balance sheet provides a basis for 
(1) computing rates of return, (2) evaluating 
the capital structure of the enterprise, and (3) 
assessing its liquidity and financial flexibility. 
The balance sheet is the fundamental report of 
a company's possessions, debts and capital 
invested. Before investing in any company, an 
                                                 
1 “Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting,” 
Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC 2 (8/90)), pars. 16-
19. 
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investor can use the balance sheet to examine 
the following questions: can the firm meet its 
financial obligations, how much money has 
already been invested in this company, is the 
company overly indebted, and what kind of 
assets the company has purchased with it’s 
financing (Kieso and Weygangt, 1998). 
 
Accrual Basis 
The accrual basis recognizes the impact 
of transaction on the financial statement in the 
periods when revenues and expenses occur 
instead of when cash is received or disbursed. 
The accrual basis evolves in response to a 
desire for a more complete, and therefore more 
accurate, report of the financial impact of 
various events (Horngren, Sundem, and 
Stratton, 1996).  
 
Earnings Management 
Earnings management is a new 
phenomenon, which has contributed to the 
development of accounting theory. The term 
earnings management occurs as a direct con-
sequence of the efforts undertaken by mana-
gers or preparers of financial statements in an 
attempt to affect accounting information, 
especially earnings, for his/her own and/or 
company’s benefits. Earnings management 
can not be interpreted as a negative action 
since it does not solely concern with earnings 
manipulation (Gumanti, 2000). 
 
Table 1. 
 Elements of the balance sheet  
Balance sheet element Examples 
Current asset Petty Cash, Cash at Bank, Accounts Receivable (debtor), 
Inventory, Prepayments 
Non-current assets Buildings, Motor Vehicle, Land, Equipment, Furniture, 
Investment 
Current liabilities Accounts Payable (creditors), Bank Overdraft, Accruals 
Deferred liabilities Loan, Mortgage, Debenture 
Proprietorship Capital, Net Profit, net Loss, Drawings 
Source: Cooper et al. (1997) 
  
Table 2. 
Comparing the Cash and Accrual Bases of Accounting  
 Cash Basis Accrual Basis 
Revenue is recognized when received when earned 
Expenses is recognized when paid when incurred 
Source: Porter and Norton (2001:142-143) 
 
Leuz et al. (2003), define earnings 
management as the alteration of firms’ 
reported economic performance by insiders 
to either mislead some stakeholders or to 
influence contractual outcomes. They argue 
that incentives to misrepresent firm perfor-
mance through earnings management arise, 
in part, from a conflict of interest between 
firms’ insiders and outsiders. Insiders, such as 
controlling owners or managers, can use their 
control over the firm to benefit themselves at 
the expense of other stakeholders. Managers 
and controlling owners have incentives to 
manage reported earnings in order to mask 
true firm performance and to conceal their 
private control benefits from outsiders. For 
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example, insiders can use their financial 
reporting discretion to overstate earnings and 
conceal unfavorable earnings realizations 
(i.e., losses) that would prompt outsider 
interference. Insiders can also use their 
accounting discretion to create reserves for 
future periods by understating earnings in 
years of good performance, effectively 
making reported earnings less variable than 
the firm’s true economic performance. In 
essence, insiders mask their private control 
benefits and hence reduce the likelihood of 
outside intervention by managing the level 
and variability of reported earnings. 
Obviously, agency theory studies 
frequently fall under the category of earnings 
management since a firm’s management may 
attempt to influence earnings in order to (1) 
maximize its compensation, (2) avoid the 
breaching of debt covenants of bond 
liabilities, which would prevent the payment 
of dividends, and (3) minimize reported 
income to lessen the possibility of 
governmental interference if the enterprise 
has high political visibility (Wolk and 
Tearney, 1997). 
Magnan and Cormier (1997) in 
Gumanti (2000) stated that there are three 
targets that are reachable by manager related 
to earnings management practice. The three 
targets are political cost minimization, mana-
ger wealth maximization and minimization of 
financing costs. 
 
Motivations of Earnings Management 
Manager may engage in earnings 
management for variety reasons, for example 
as stated by Scott (2000:352-364): 
 
Bonus Purpose 
 Managers have inside information on the 
firm’s net income before earnings 
management. Since outside parties, including 
the Board itself, may be unable to learn what 
this number is, Healy predicted that managers 
would opportunistically manage net income so 
as to maximize their bonuses under their 
firm’s compensation plans. 
 
Other contractual motivations 
There are other contractual motivations 
for earnings management. An important case 
arises from long-term lending contrast, which 
typically contains covenants to protect the 
lenders against actions by managers that are 
against the lenders’ best interest, such as 
excessive dividends, additional borrowing, or 
letting working capital or shareholders’ equity 
fall below specified levels, all of which dilute 
the security of existing lenders. 
 
Political motivations 
Many firms are quite politically visible. 
Such firms may want to manage earnings so as 
to reduce their visibility. This would entail, for 
example, accounting practices and procedures 
to minimize reported net income, particularly 
during periods of high prosperity. Otherwise, 
public pressure may arise for the government 
to step in with increased regulation or other 
means to lower profitability. 
 
Taxation motivations 
Income taxation is perhaps the most 
obvious motivation for earnings management. 
However, taxation authorities tend to impose 
their own accounting rulers for calculation of 
taxable income, thereby reducing firms’ room 
to maneuver. Consequently, taxation should 
not play a major role in earnings management 
decisions in general. 
 
Changes of CEO 
A variety of income management 
motivations exist around the time of a change 
of CEO. For example, the bonus plan 
hypothesis predicts that CEOs approaching 
retirement would be particularly likely to 
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engage in a strategy of income maximization, 
to increase their bonuses. Similarly, CEOs of 
poorly performing firms may income-
maximize to prevent, or postpone, being 
fired. This motivation also applies to new 
CEOs, especially if large write-offs can be 
blamed on the previous CEO. 
 
Initial public offerings 
 By definition, firms making initial public 
offerings (IPOs) do not have an established 
market price. This raises the question of how 
to value the shares of such firms. Presu-
mably, financial accounting information 
included in the prospectus is a useful 
information source. 
 
To communicate information to investors 
 The use of earnings management to 
communicate information to investors may 
seem questionable in view of efficient 
securities market theory. Investors will look 
through firms’ accounting policy choices 
when evaluating and comparing earnings 
performance. Recall, however, that we define 
market efficiency relative to publicly 
available information. If earnings manage-
ment can reveal inside information, it can 
actually improve the informative ness of 
financial reporting. 
 
Patterns of Earnings Management 
Scott (2000:365) tried to collect and 
briefly summarized some earnings manage-
ment patterns: 
 
Taking a bath 
 This can take place during of 
organizational stress or reorganization, 
including the hiring of new CEO. If a firm 
must report a loss, management may feel 
compelled to report a large one; it has little to 
lose at this point. Consequently, it will write 
off assets, provides for excepted future costs, 
and generally “clear the decks”. This will 
enhance the probability of future reported 
profits. Healy (1985), also mentions that 
managers whose net income is below the 
bogey of the bonus plan may also take a bath, 
for a similar reason-it will enhance the 
probability of future bonuses. In effect, the 
recording of large write offs puts future 
earnings “in the bank”. 
 
Income minimization 
 This is similar to taking a bath, but less 
extreme. Such a pattern may be chosen by 
politically visible firm during periods of high 
profitability. Policies that suggest income 
minimization include rapid write offs of 
capital assets and intangibles, expensing of 
advertising and R&D expenditures, successful-
efforts accounting for oil and gas exploration 
costs, and so on. Income taxation, such as for 
LIFO inventory, provides another set of 
motivations for this pattern, as does 
enhancement of arguments for relief from 
foreign competition. 
 
Income maximization 
 As seen in Healy’s study, managers may 
engage in pattern of maximization of reported 
net income for bonus purpose, providing this 
does not put them above the cap. Firms that 
are close to debt covenant violations may also 
maximize income. 
 
Income smoothing 
 This is perhaps the most interesting ear-
nings management pattern. Healy suggest that 
managers have an incentive to smooth income 
sufficiently that it remains between the bogey 
and cap. Otherwise, earnings may be 
temporally or permanently lost for bonus 
purpose. Furthermore, if managers are risk-
averse, they will prefer a less variable bonus 
stream, and hence may want to smooth net 
income. 
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Arya et al. (1998) stated that two of the 
better known forms of earnings management 
are "smoothing" and "big bath." For example, 
in estimating their bad debt allowance, 
companies might be tempted to provide a 
generous allowance in good years and skimp 
in lean years in order to smooth the stream of 
reported earnings. In contrast, the big bath 
hypothesis suggests that managers undertake 
income decreasing discretionary accruals in 
lean years. Perhaps managers believe that 
one very poor performance report is not as 
harmful as several mediocre performance 
reports. It has been suggested that big baths 
often occur under the guise of restructuring 
charges and may coincide with top 
management transition. 
 
Hypotheses Formulation 
Financial reporting consists of balance 
sheet, income statement, cash flow statement 
and notes of financial statement. All of those 
financial reports are used as financial 
information for the internal and external 
parties of the company. The internal parties 
such as managers, accountants, owners and 
employees while the external parties such as 
investors, creditors, government, customers 
and market. The financial information of the 
company will describe about the condition, 
economics prospect, investment plan also 
earnings forecast and dividend which is 
became a basis on decisions making.   
The balance sheet reports the 
summary of financial position at a given 
point in time. It shows assets, liabilities, and 
owners' equity. The income statement reports 
the excess of revenue over expense, that is, 
the earnings (profit, net income), or in the 
event of an excess of expense over revenue, 
the net loss of the period.  Earnings are 
frequently used as a measure of company 
performance or as the basis for other 
measures, such as return on investment or 
earnings per share (IASC, par 69). In other 
word, earnings are the summary measure of 
firms performance produced under the accrual 
basis of accounting. Therefore, the information 
of earnings is the main information that is 
needed by the investors to look for the 
performance of the company. In order to 
attract the investor in turn to invest in the 
company, the managers try to give a good 
financial report through accrual accounting to 
manage the earnings.  It is concerned to Teoh 
et al. (1997) and DuCharme et al. (2000), 
which is stated that conceptually earnings 
management can be done because the accrual 
accounting give the possibility of managerial 
policy in confession of time, earnings and cost. 
Actually, earnings are affecting by 
income and expenses as the element that 
directly related to the measurement of 
earnings. Income increases in economics 
benefits during the accounting period in the 
form of inflows or enhancements of assets or 
decreases of liabilities that result in increases 
in equity, while expenses decreases in 
economic benefits during the accounting 
periods in the form of outflows or depletions 
of assets or incurrence of liabilities that result 
in decreases in equity (IASC, par 70). The 
negative of earnings, that is loss, will increase 
the earnings management; conversely, the 
positive of earnings, that is profit, will 
decrease the earnings management. Meanwhile 
assets, liabilities and equity are the element of 
the balance sheet. It is concerned with the 
literature that stated there is a relationship 
between balance sheet and income statement. 
So that, the effort of managers’ to manage the 
earnings or called as earnings management, 
would base on the balance sheet. 
The articulation between balance sheet 
and income statement causes accruals to be 
reflected in earnings on the income statement 
while at the same time being reflected in net 
assets on the balance sheet. Opportunistic 
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accrual management (within the bounds of 
GAAP) that increases earnings causes a 
firm’s net assets to be reflected at higher 
values than would be reported under a neutral 
use of GAAP.  
According to Barton and Simko, 2002, 
that basic accounting relations show that net 
income in a given period is the free cash 
flows (FCF) (i.e., the operating cash flows 
net of investment) the firm generates plus the 
change in net operating assets during the 
accounting period (∆NOA).  
Prior research of Barton and Simko 
(2002) shows that the likelihood of reporting 
larger positive or smaller negative quarterly 
earnings surprises decreases with the 
beginning balance of net operating assets 
relative to sales, suggesting that managers’ 
ability to optimistically bias earnings 
decreases with the extent to which net assets 
values are already overstated on the balance 
sheet. According to Smith (2004), there is the 
constraint effect in four earnings surprises 
settings: small positive, large positive, small 
negative, and large negative. And to the 
extent that a firm’s net operating assets 
(NOA) have been affected by income-
increasing earnings management, the 
reported net assets are likely to be overstated. 
Earnings management is conducted by 
the manager in the process of financial 
reporting because some motivation to 
achieve the goals. Actually, earnings 
management is a tool to manage earnings by 
using the financial report information. 
Earnings surprise as an earning report is 
determined by balance sheet as summary of 
financial position. The good of financial 
position refers to the high earnings (profit) of 
the company so that the earning management 
is low. Or in the other words that when the 
report of earning (earnings surprise) is 
higher, the earnings management will be high 
to increase their performance to attract the 
investors.  
Barton and Simko (2002) stated that the 
articulation between the income statement and 
the balance sheet ensures that biased 
assumptions reflected in earnings are also 
reflected in net assets value. The overstated on 
balance sheet means that the reachable 
earnings of the company’s is low, so that the 
large positive or small negative earnings report 
decrease.  
This research is a replication from the 
previous research by Barton and Simko (2002) 
about earning management constraint. Barton 
and Simko (2002) predict that managers will 
use available financial reporting discretion to 
report higher levels of earnings surprises, all 
else equal. Based on the main problem, review 
of the related literature and previous research 
about earnings management constraint, so that 
the hypotheses of this research can be 
formulated as follows: 
Ha1 : the reported large positive or small 
negative earnings surprises decree-
ses with the extent to which net 
assets are overstated on the balance 
sheet. 
Ha2 : the reported large negative or small 
positive earnings surprises increases 
with the extent to which net assets 
are overstated on the balance sheet 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Population and Sample 
In this research, population encompasses 
companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Therefore, the research object is all of the 
manufacture company listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. Sample of this research is 
taken by Purposive Sampling method. Purpo-
sive Sampling method is taken sample which 
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is not random and sample chosen base on the 
certain consideration (Sekaran, 1992:235).  
 
Data Collection 
This research uses the secondary data, 
the data source taken from Indonesia Stock 
Exchange both in the form of file or printing, 
which contains information about the data 
needed in this research. 
 
Research Variables 
Dependent variable 
Earnings surprise (SURPRISE) is 
ICMD (Indonesian Capital Market Directory) 
actual EPS for quarter t less the consensus 
forecast for quarter t, both rounded to the 
nearest penny. The consensus forecast is the 
mean of analysts’ most recent EPS forecast 
for quarter t available on ICMD prior to the 
earnings announcement for quarter t. This 
research combine SURPRISE on ≤ -5¢ into 
one category and SURPRISE ≥ 5¢ into 
another;  
 
Independent variable 
1. NOA is net operating assets (i.e., 
shareholders’ equity less cash and 
marketable securities, plus total debt) at 
the beginning of quarter t, scaled by 
sales for quarter t – 1; 
2. SHARES is weighted average number of 
common shares outstanding during 
quarter t;  
3. BIG4 is indicator variable coded 1 if the 
firm has a Big 4 auditor in quarter t, 0 
otherwise;  
4. PB is market capitalization of common 
shares divided by shareholders’ equity, 
both at the end of  quarter t;  
5. LTGN_RISK is indicator variable coded 
1 if the firm is in one of the following 
industries: 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, computer, 
electronics, or retail sector, 0 otherwise;  
6. PREV_MB is indicator variable coded 1 
if, based on ICMD, the firm reported a 
nonnegative earnings surprise in quarter t 
– 1, 0 otherwise; 
7. CV_FORECAST is coefficient of 
variation in analysts' most recent forecasts 
for quarter t;  
8. SALES_GROWTH is sales for quarter t 
divided by sales for t - 3, less 1;  
9. ROE is net income for quarter t divided by 
shareholders’ equity at the end of quarter 
t;  
10. ∆ROE is ROE for quarter t less ROE for 
quarter t – 1; 
11. MKT_CAP is natural logarithm of market 
capitalization of common shares at the end 
of quarter t.  
 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Selecting sample in this research is 
based on the company consistency in 
publishing the quarterly financial statement 
and complete data that owned by manufac-
turing companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2008-2009. The data used 
are secondary data taken from the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) corner in the Economic 
Faculty of UPN “Veteran”, libraries and 
internet. After the observation and the selec-
tion to the manufacture companies listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange there are 68 
companies that can fulfill the criteria.  
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Table 3. 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and Rank Correlation  
with Earnings Surprise (SURPRISE) 
Independent 
Variable 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Predicted 
Sign 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation with 
SURPRISE 
NOA 3.04 2.40 - -0.84** 
SHARES 1254.42 1976.72 - -0.15** 
BIG4 0.50 0.50 ? 0.21** 
PB 1.26 2.41 + 0.29** 
LTGN_RISK 0.76 0.43 - -0.05 
PREV_MB 0.55 0.50 + 0.28** 
CV_FRCST -136.86 328.95 + 0.01 
SALES_GRW 0.18 0.67 + 0.18** 
ROE 0.06 0.36 + 0.24** 
ROE -0.006 0.55 + 0.08 
MKT_CAP 5.54 0.87 + 0.11* 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test for signed predictions and two-tailed test otherwise) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed test for signed predictions and two-tailed   test otherwise) 
 
Table 4. 
Multicollinearity Test 
Variable Collinearity 
Statistics 
Decision  
Tolerance VIF 
NOA 0.781 1.281 No Multicollinearity 
SHARES 0.614 1.628 No Multicollinearity 
BIG4 0.777 1.286 No Multicollinearity 
PB 0.864 1.158 No Multicollinearity 
LTGN_RISK 0.378 2.646 No Multicollinearity 
PREV_MB 0.936 1.069 No Multicollinearity 
CV_FRCST 0.386 2.591 No Multicollinearity 
SALES_GRW 0.920 1.086 No Multicollinearity 
ROE 0.826 1.211 No Multicollinearity 
ROE 0.887 1.127 No Multicollinearity 
MKT_CAP 0.489 2.047 No Multicollinearity 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for 
the independent variables. The mean level of 
NOA is 3.04, suggesting that net operating 
assets are about third as large or larger as 
sales for most firm quarters. Sample firm 
have on average 1254.42 million shares 
outstanding, and 50 percent of them have a 
BIG4 auditor. The mean price-to-book ratio 
is 1.26; about 76 percent of firms are in highly 
litigious industries. The mean coefficient of 
variation analysts’ forecast is -136.86. 
Average sales growth is 18 percent; however 
ROE is 6 percent, about 10 percent higher than 
ROE for same quarter in the previous year. 
The mean MKT_CAP is 5.54. 
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Classical Assumption Tests 
Multicollinearity Test 
The term multicollinearity means the 
existence of a “perfect” or exact, linear 
relationship among some or all explanatory 
variables of a regression model. The 
existence of multicollinearity causes in 
appropriate estimation result (Gujarati, 
1995). The classical linear regression model 
assumes that there is no multicollinearity 
among explana-tory variables because if 
multicollinearity is perfect, the regressions 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are 
determined and the standard error is infinite. 
According to Gujarati (1995), as a rule of 
thumb, if the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) 
of variable exceeds 10 and value of tolerance 
is closed to 0, variable is said to be highly 
collinear. 
Table 4 shows that there is no 
multicollinearity among independent 
variables in this research. Because VIF is less 
than 10 and tolerance value of each variable 
is more than 0.1. Multicollinearity happens 
when variance inflation factor (VIF) is more 
than 10 or tolerance less than 0.1.   
 
Autocorrelation Test 
To test whether there is autocorrelation, 
the Durbin Watson (D-W) table statistics is 
used. The criteria used must be between dU 
and 4-dU in order that there is no 
autocorrelation fulfilled (Gujarati, D N, 
1995:343-344).  
Table 5. 
 Autocorrelation Test 
dU 4-Du Durbin-
Watson 
Detection 
1,885 2,115 1.538 No Auto-
correlation 
 
The dU value is obtained from D-W 
value based on the number of samples and 
the number of independent variables. In this 
research, the number of samples is 408 and 
there are 11 independent variables. In the table 
of Durbin Watson at the level of significance 
5%, the sample which is more than 200 and 11 
independent variables can be explained by dU 
value 1.885 thus 4-dU = 4 – 1.885 = 2.115. 
Thus, D-W is 1.538 (between 1.885–2.115) 
that is fulfills the assumption there is no 
autocorrelation in the regression model.  
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
The heteroscedasticity symptom will 
appear when the residual has the difference 
variance from one observation to another. The 
existence of heteroscedasticity causes the 
regression coefficient estimation becomes 
inefficient. There are two methods (informal 
methods and formal methods) to detect the 
heteroscedasticity. In this research, to detect 
the heteroscedasticity by using formal methods 
called “Spearman’s rank correlation test” 
(Gujarati, 1995). 
Table 6. reports the heteroscedasticity 
test for all independent variable by using 
Spearman’s rank correlation test. The table 
reports that there is no heteroscedasticity 
among the independent variable. To indicate 
that there is no heteroscedasticity, the 
probability value is more than α = 0.05. 
Heteroscedasticity happens when the 
coefficients of the computed t value is less 
than the critical t value or the computed t value 
is more than - the critical t value means that 
there is no heteroscedasticity. This research 
uses the heteroscedasticity test with α = 0.20 
(more than α = 0.05) and the coefficients of 
the computed t value is less than the critical t 
value (0.843). It means that there is no 
heteroscedasticity in this data. 
The Result of Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis testing will be done by 
using the generalized ordered logit regression. 
The dependent variable (SURPRISE) is an 
ordinal dependent variable and it allows the 
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coefficients on all independent variables to 
vary across levels of SURPRISE. The 
generalized ordered logit model as follow: 
Pr (SURPRISEit < k) / Pr (SURPRISEit  k) 
= exp(β0,k + β1,kNOAit + β2,kSHARESit + 
β3,kBIG4it + β4,kPBit + β5,k LTGN_RISKit  + 
β6,kPREV_MBit + β7,kCV_FORECASTit  + 
β8,kSALES_GROWTHit + β9,kROEit + 
β10,kROEit +  β11,kMKT_CAPit + it)                                             
 
From that model above, it will test the 
sign (coefficient) of each independent variable 
(right-side) to prove the hypothesis and reject 
the null hypothesis. The prediction sign of 
each independent variable is negative sign on 
NOA, SHARES, LTGN_RISK and 
CV_FORECAST; positive sign on PB, 
PREV_MB, SALES_GROWTH, ROE, ROE 
and MKT_CAP. Meanwhile, BIG4 is no 
prediction. Those entire coefficients are in 
order to reject Ho1 and Ho2. 
 
Table 6. 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Independent 
Variable 
The 
computed t 
value 
The critical 
t value 
Decision 
NOA -0.84 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
SHARES -0.15 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
BIG4 0.21 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
PB 0.29 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
LTGN_RISK -0.05 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
PREV_MB 0.28 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
CV_FRCST 0.01 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
SALES_GRW 0.18 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
ROE 0.24 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
ROE 0.08 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
MKT_CAP 0.11 0.843 No heteroscedasticity 
         * n = 333; df = 332; α = 0.20 
Table 7. 
Regression Result for Generalized Ordered Logit Model 
Model: Pr(SURPRISEit < k) / Pr(SURPRISEit  k) = exp(β0,k + β1,kNOAit + 
β2,kSHARESit + β3,kBIG4it + β4,kPBit + β5,k LTGN_RISKit  + β6,kPREV_MBit + 
β7,kCV_FORECASTit  + β8,kSALES_GROWTHit + β9,kROEit + 
β10,kROEit +  β11,kMKT_CAPit + it)     
Independent Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
NOA - -0.140 
SHARES + 5.447E-06 
BIG4 ? 0.012 
PB + 0.015 
LTGN_RISK - -0.111 
PREV_MB + 0.116 
CV_FRCST + 0.000 
SALES_GRW + 0.033 
ROE - -0.011 
ROE + 0.030 
MKT_CAP + 0.014 
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Table 7. reports that the coefficient 
regression on NOA is 0.140, it explains that 
decrease (because negative sign) on NOA 
will increase SURPRISE. Conversely, 
SURPRISE will decrease when NOA 
increase. This result is consistent with Ha 
that the earnings surprise decreases with 
extend to which net operating assets are 
already overstated on the balance sheet. 
While the coefficient regression of 
SHARE is positive, it means that the 
increases on SHARES will increase 
SURPRISE. It is contradictory with the 
evidence that managers of firms with more 
shares outstanding may find it more difficult 
to manage earnings toward expectation. The 
insignificant coefficient on BIG4 suggests 
that audit quality is unrelated to the earnings 
surprise. The coefficient on PB and 
PREV_MB are positive, and for PREV_MB 
is a significant coefficient at the 0.05 level. 
These results suggest that increases in the 
firm price-to-book ratio, its record in the 
previous quarter. While, coefficient regression 
in LTGN_RISK is negative contrast to the 
predicted sign which is positive. The 
coefficient on CV_FRCST is positive; means 
that firm with imprecise forecast are more 
likely to miss expectations by large amount. 
Payne and Robb (2000) state that managers are 
more likely to report earnings that misses 
expectation if the expectations are imprecise. 
The coefficient on ROE is negative; it means 
that net income for quarter t lower than 
shareholders` equity. Finally, the coefficients 
on SALES_GRW, ∆ROE, and MKT_CAP are 
positive, suggesting that level of earnings 
surprise increase with firm performance and 
firm size. 
Coefficient determination (Adjusted 
R2) is 0.569 which means that around 56.9% 
of the variation on SURPRISE variable can be 
explained by 11 independent variables in the 
model, where as the residual of 43.1% is 
explained by other factors outside the model. 
Standard error of estimation is 0.319. 
 
Table 8. 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
The Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .569 .319 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LTGNRISK, PREVMB, STDEV, EPS, DROE, PB, BIG4, 
SLGROWTH, SHARE, ROE, NOA, MKT_CAP, CVFRCST. 
 
 
Table 9. 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regresion 
Residual Total 
45.900 
32.664 
78.565 
12 
320 
332 
3.825 
.102 
37.472 .000a 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LTGNRISK, PREVMB, STDEV, EPS, DROE, PB, BIG4, 
SLGROWTH, SHARE, ROE, NOA, MKT_CAP, CVFRCST. 
b. Dependent Variable: SURPRISE 
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  The standard deviation of SURPRISE 
is 0.486. It is more than standard error of 
estimation which is just only 0.319. Because 
it is less than the standard deviation, the 
regression model is better in bestirred as 
predictor SURPRISE than the mean of 
SURPRISE itself.F- Statistic testing obtained 
from regression analysis on Table 9 shows 
the values of F-Statistic for the model which is 
37.472 by the significant level of 0.000. 
Because the probability (0.000) < 0.05, the 
regression model can be used to predict the 
earnings surprise (SURPRISE). In other word, 
all of the independent variables simultaneously 
influence the SURPRISE.  
 
Table 10. 
t-Statistic Testing 
Model t Sig.  
(Constant) 6.343 0.000 
NOA -16.975 0.000 
SHARES 0.481 0.631 
BIG4 0.295 0.768 
PB 1.895 0.059 
LTGN_RISK -1.665 0.097 
PREV_MB 3.190 0.002 
CV_FRCST 1.622 0.106 
SALES_GRW 1.208 0.228 
ROE -0.198 0.843 
ROE 0.900 0.369 
MKT_CAP 0.493 0.622 
 
t-statistic is used to test the constant 
significant and dependent variable 
(SURPRISE). Taking decision based on 
probability, if the probability > 0.05, Ho is 
accepted and if the probability < 0.05, Ho is 
rejected. As seen in column Sig 
(significance) is 0.000 (Constant), 0.000 
(NOA), 0.002 (PREV_MB), in other word,  it 
far bellowed 0.05. So, Ho rejected or 
significant coefficient regression or Constant, 
NOA and PREV_MB are simultaneously 
significant to SURPRISE. Thus result 
consistent to the first and second hypothesis 
that the changes of earnings surprises extent 
to the net assets on the balance sheet. 
Although the others remaining independent 
variable, the probability is more than 0.05, 
Ho is accepted or non- significant coefficient 
regression or SHARES, BIG4, PB, 
LTGN_RISK, CV_FRCST, ROE, ROE and 
MKT_CAP are not influential significantly to 
SURPRISE. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The balance sheet accumulates the effects 
of the previous accounting choices, so the 
level of net assets partly reflects the extent of 
previous earnings management. Based on the 
result of this research, it can be concluded that 
the change on earnings surprise affected by the 
net asset on balance sheet. The regression 
analysis result of the model gives the evidence 
to the hypothesis that the balance sheet is as an 
earnings management constraint. Coefficient 
value of NOA which is negative gives the 
probability that the decreasing on NOA will 
increase the earnings surprise (SURPRISE). 
Although most of the other remaining 
independent variables as a control are 
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insignificant based on T-statistic testing, they 
are simultaneously significant to SURPRISE 
on F-statistic testing. Earnings management 
which is done by managers’ has kinds of 
pattern and kinds of motivation in order to 
achieve a certain goal. The management does 
earnings management by affecting the 
financial statement report.  
Managers have some incentives to 
manage earnings, such as reduce the 
likelihood of outside intervention, maximize 
company compensation, avoid the breaching 
of debt covenants of bond liabilities, 
minimize reported income to lessen the 
possibility of governmental interference, etc.  
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